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Synthetic Life and the Value of Life
Erik Persson*
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
If humans eventually attain the ability to create new life forms, how will it affect the value
of life? This is one of several questions that can be sources of concern when discussing
synthetic life, but is the concern justified? In an attempt to answer this question, I have
analyzed some possible reasons why an ability to create synthetic life would threaten
the value of life in general (that is, not just of the synthetic creations), to see if they really
give us reason to worry. The main conclusion is that it is unlikely that a future human
ability to create life will really have a great negative impact on these characteristics of life.
It therefore seems unlikely that the value of life will be negatively affected by the ability
to create synthetic life, though it is possible that the properties in question will be less
salient in the synthetic life and thus that the value of the synthetic life will be lower than
that of existing life, which in turn can lead to a disturbing difference in value between
different kinds of life.
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INTRODUCTION
Will the value of life be negatively affected if human beings acquire the ability to create life from
non-living material? In this article, I will take a close look at some phenomena that have three things
in common: They are closely associated with life, they are commonly seen as conferring value to the
entities that possess them, and they may be negatively affected by a human ability to create life. The
purpose of this investigation is to find out whether each of these properties of life are threatened by
a future human ability to create life, and if that will threaten the value of life. The study concludes
that even though some of these properties may be questioned in the new life forms, this will not
affect the value of existing life or of life in general.
The characteristics I will take a closer look at are the originality of life, the origin of life,
the mystery that surrounds life and its origin, the seemingly obvious fact that life is a natural
phenomenon, and the ability of life to create itself and to find its own way, that is, its autonomy. In
addition, I will briefly discuss the diversity of life as an example of a trait that is highly valued, and
that may actually be strengthened by a human ability to create life if it leads to the creation of more,
and more different, life forms.
Before we start the investigation, let me explain a little more about what I mean, and what I do
not mean, when I talk about the value of life. What does it mean that life has value? As I imagine
it, it is about our attitudes toward life. The vast majority of people seem to have a generally positive
attitude toward life. Of course, this does not prevent one from having a negative or neutral attitude
toward particular individual lives or life forms. One may be of the opinion that a certain life, or even
a certain type of life, a life in constant pain and without hope of relief, for example, is a negative life
that one would rather end. Most of us are probably also of the opinion that it is perfectly acceptable
to end the lives of millions of bacteria with the help of antibiotics, or for that matter, every time we
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wash our hands, to protect our own lives. None of these
cases, however, prevents us from thinking that life is, basically,
something good. It can manifest itself in everything from being
happy that life arose to devoting one’s own life to protecting
the lives of others or aspiring to spread life across the galaxy. If
life is something good, why not make sure it exists in as many
places as possible in the universe? Maybe it also means a curiosity
about how life originated, how it works and if there is life outside
our planet. Some may even see the positive value of life as an
argument to create more types of life, that is, synthetic life. In a
more philosophical language, one might say that life has value if
you, all other things being equal, think that life is something good.
How that value stands in relation to other values depends on how
valuable one thinks life is and how high the competing values are,
but I will not go into that here. I will also not talk about the life of a
particular individual and I will not limit myself to any particular
kind of life, such as human or mammalian life. The value I am
thinking of here is something more fundamental. It is not about
the value of specific living individuals, but about the value of life
itself. In other words, a value that is independent of which living
being we are talking about. When I talk about the value of life, I
am not talking about the value of you, your cat, or your potted
plants, but about the shared fact that you are all alive.
Value is a concept that comes in many different forms. When
I talk about the value of life, I only refer to so-called, end value,
that is, whether life has value as an end in itself (Independently
of whether it also has value as a means to something else)
to a valuing entity, for instance, a human being. I am not
talking about instrumental value, economic value, or indeed
about moral status.
Economic “value” (price) is a very different concept than the
kind of value I am talking about here. We can illustrate the
difference by comparing the value and the price of a piece of
art. The most valuable works of art are considered economically
“invaluable,” not because they could not be sold (some collectors
are willing to pay very large sums of money for works of art that
they will never dare to show or admit that they have) but because
their value cannot be properly stated in monetary terms. If, for
example, someone wanted to buy a unique work of art, say, Mona
Lisa, with the aim of destroying it, I suspect that it would lead to
extremely upset feelings no matter how much money the buyer is
willing to pay for the “fun” of destroying it.
Moral status is also, but obviously for different reasons,
something completely different from value – of any kind,
including end value. Unfortunately, the question of someone’s
or something’s moral status is all too often confused with or
conflated with the question of its value. As I prepared this
article, I found this to be the case also in connection with
discussions about the value of life and about synthetic biology,
which made it more difficult that it should have been to make
sense of some of the literature in the area. I find it important,
however, to keep the two apart and to stress that someone’s moral
status is completely independent of that someone’s value. Moral
status is something you have by virtue of having interests that
others need to take into account when they act. That is, you
have moral status if and only if things can have (positive or
negative) value to you. In a more technical language, you need
to be a subject who can experience things in a subjective way
as being positive or negative. If a being does not have subjective
experiences that can be classified as positive or negative for that
being in at least a rudimentary sense, then it is very difficult to
understand what it would even mean that this being has interests
and even more difficult to see what it would mean to respect
these interests.
Value is different. An antique vase can have a very high value,
regardless of whether it experiences something itself. If the vase
falls to the floor and breaks, it means a loss of value even though
the vase does not feel any pain and does not feel offended or
sad that it will no longer get to experience the admiring glances
of future guests. The vase, therefore, has no moral status but
it has value. If we have a moral duty not to crush the vase
or even to protect the vase from being crushed by others, it
is because it has value to other valuing entities, perhaps to its
owner or perhaps to everyone who visits the museum where it
is exhibited, and maybe to humans who have never seen and will
never see the vase if the vase, for example, is part of our human
cultural heritage.
This moral imperative to protect what has value to other
moral objects also means that even though end value and
moral status are not the same thing, and even though end
value does not imply moral status, doing something that
would diminish the end value of life is still a question of
moral significance.
When talking of the value of life in this text I do not intend to
estimate how valuable it is, either in absolute terms or relative to
other things. I leave this exercise entirely up to the reader. Maybe
you are of the opinion that life itself has no value at all. Maybe
you are of the opinion that life is something that is extremely
valuable and must be protected and preserved at all costs, or,
perhaps most likely, you are somewhere in between. No matter
where you are on that scale, however, you can always ask the
question of whether the value will be reduced on the day we
humans learn to make life on our own. This is true even if you
think that life has zero value. After all, no value at all is better
than a negative value.
One difficulty when talking about the value of life is that
there is no generally accepted definition of life. It is, of course,
a challenge in itself to talk about the value of something that one
does not fully agree on what it is (see, e.g., Abbott and Persson,
2021). I will not go into this question in more detail here as
it would lead too far from the main question. One thing that
needs some elaboration, however, is the meaning of the phrase
“creating life,” which is central in this article. When I talk about
creation of life or created life, I refer to the deliberate process of
making new life from non-living material according to principles
of engineering. I do not refer to the propagation of life that goes
on all the time and where all the new lives directly descend from
already existing life. I am also not talking about modification of
existing life, as is already done in different ways ranging from
surgery via genetic modification to the substitution of an entire
genome that was done at the J Craig Venter Institute in 2010
(Gibson et al., 2010). Instead, I am talking about a new origin
of life, where life, not related to existing life is engineered from
entirely non-living material.
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THE ORIGINALITY OF LIFE
The way we value life is sometimes compared with how we
value art (e.g., Elliot, 1982). Can that help us in this situation?
Originality is commonly seen as a reason to attach high value to,
for example, a work of art. We tend to value works of art higher if
they are original (e.g., Kozbelt, 2004). If something is significantly
different from everything else, it also becomes more interesting.
A work of art that differs radically from all other works of art,
or even from all other objects in the world, creates interest and
increases the value of the work of art, often regardless of whether
it is considered beautiful or not. Works of art that are less original
are considered less valuable than art that is more original (other
aspects being equal). Things that are mass-produced have, from
this perspective, a much lower value even when they are as
beautiful as an original painting or sculpture.
How does this relate to the question of the value of life? Does it
mean that if we learn to create life and thus get multiple editions
of life, it will diminish life’s value because life will no longer be a
unique phenomenon?
What we have to ask ourselves here is whether life is really
original in the same way as a work of art, whether it is really
from there that life get its special value, and if this originality will
be diminished if we start producing life with a different origin
than existing life.
All living beings differ from all other living beings in some
way, but this applies to everything and can hardly be a reason to
assign any extra high value to it (What would “extra high value”
even mean if everything has it?). Besides, many living beings
are also similar in some respects. That is why we can divide
life into species, genera and so on. It is even the case that all
life on earth today is related, albeit distantly so. We all descend
from a common ancestor, the Last Universal Common Ancestor
(LUCA). Admittedly, this means that each of us is not as original
as we might like to think, though, relative to things that are not
alive, one might still claim that we are quite original just by being
alive. Exactly how much life as we know it today differs from non-
life is a question that largely depends on how we define “life.”
Defining “life” is not an easy task, however, (e.g., Persson, 2013;
Abbott and Persson, 2021), which makes it difficult to base the
value of life on how and how much we differ from the non-living.
The fact that all life on earth originates from the same “ancestor”
means on the other hand that we living beings together differ
clearly from everything that is non-living, namely through our
common origin. Can this fact be used to assert the originality of
life? If life has only arisen once, then we can rightly say that life is
really original.
However, the answer to the question of whether life has only
arisen once is that we do not know. It may be that life on Earth has
only arisen once, but it may also be that it has arisen several times
but that only one of the times has succeeded in the sense that life
managed to survive and spread across the planet. In addition, we
do not yet know if there is life outside our planet.
If life has only arisen once in the history of the universe, then
we can really say that the life we know on Earth is original,
even unique, in the same way as a unique work of art, like the
Mona Lisa for example. If instead, it is the case that life has
arisen several times, then it still seems to be the case that “our”
life is unique in the sense that it is the only now existing life
on Earth. It means it is not unique in the universal sense that
it is the only life in the universe, but it will be the only life on
Earth and probably the only life of its kind in the universe, so
it is still original enough to be assigned a very high value. We
might say that it has value in the same sense, and to the same
degree, as an archeological finding of an object of which there
were once several specimens but of which there is now only one
left, and of which there may be several preserved specimens in
other countries, but where the exact specimen we have in front
of us is the only preserved specimen in our country. Even in that
case, however, it seems justified to attach a rather high value to it
based on its originality, even though it is then not entirely unique
from a broader (geographical and temporal) perspective.
One can also reason that the physical and chemical conditions
on different planets are quite different, so if there is life on other
planets, that life is probably quite different compared to life on
our planet. If we compare with works of art again, there are a
lot of invaluable works of art on Earth today, but each of them
is original relative to the others. They are all works of art, but
they are sufficiently different from each other to be given a special
value. Maybe we can say the same about life on different celestial
bodies? If the universe is full of life, but life on each planet is
different enough from life on any other planet, we might still be
able to say that each type of life is original enough to deserve an
extremely high value.
Our next question is, does the value of life depend on its
originality? This question is not entirely easy to answer. When
I write this, we only know of one instance of life and have never
experienced a situation where there have been several editions of
life (that is, life with different origins). What we can say is that
even though every life form we know of today has a common
origin and even though we all have a lot in common, there is also a
large degree of variation. Maybe this variation within the category
of life, with each life form showing a high degree of originality
within the class of life, is one of the aspects of life that makes
us value life as such so much? This interpretation of the role of
originality in the value of life is a bit of a stretch from the original
concept (originality among life rather than originality of life) but
it seems to make sense. The diversity of life is often mentioned as
an important reason for why we value it so highly (Kleinig, 1991).
We could even twitch our comparison with art, and instead of
comparing life with Mona Lisa, we can compare life with art as
such, in which case, maybe the highly valued originality among
works of art is one of the reasons we tend to value art so much?
Is it reasonable to expect that the originality of life (in either
of the senses above) will diminish if we learn to artificially create
life? Let us go back to the comparison of life with a work of art.
We previously stated that a mass-produced work does not have
the same value as a work of which there is only one copy, for
example, the Mona Lisa. On the other hand, there are actually a
very large number of reproductions of the Mona Lisa. You can
even buy postcards with the Mona Lisa motive in the museum
shop at the Louvre. So, there is actually a myriad of Mona Lisa
copies. What does this mean for the value of the Mona Lisa?
In order to give a sensible answer to this question, we must ask
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ourselves what it is we are referring to. Is it Leonardo’s original
painting, is it the copies, or is it both? If we start with the copies,
they do not seem to be valued very highly. They can be bought
quite cheaply, and we would not be terribly upset if a postcard
with a Mona Lisa motif disappears. So, what does the existence
of all these Mona Lisa copies mean for the value of the original
painting? The answer seems to be: Nothing. No matter how many
copies we make of the Mona Lisa, this does not seem to in any way
diminish the originality of the original and thus not its value. It is
part of the very concept of “originality” that the original is always
the original no matter how many copies are made. The fact that
the copy is a copy makes its value smaller, but it does not diminish
the value of the original.
How does this reasoning transfer to the value of life? It seems
to imply that if we succeed in making several instances of life on
earth with us as creators, these copies will have a lower value,
at least from this special perspective, while the original is not
affected at all. It is still the original and it retains its value.
If we instead compare life with art as such and derive value
from the originality of the multitude of different life forms instead
of the originality of life itself, the situation may be different.
An addition of life forms in the form of synthetic life would
not make life less multifaceted. We might even be justified to
claim that it would add originality, both by adding more original
life forms, and by adding life forms that are more original (by
having a different origin). On the other hand, we can safely say
that the created life will initially contain much lower diversity
than the original life, which would reinforce the image of a class
difference between the two. In any case, this should be easy
to fix by allowing, or even encouraging, the creation of many
different artificial life forms. Whether this is advisable from other
perspectives is of course another question.
Whether it really works to make such a comparison between
life and art is difficult to answer, which is probably due partly to
the difficulty of identifying what it is that is so special about life
to begin with. In part, it is probably also because we do not have
any synthetic life around today and therefore cannot know for
sure how our values will change once such life appears, but it
would of course be good to have a hint of an answer before we
start making copies. Once they exist, it will be too late to change.
The reasoning about originality and the comparison with art does
not seem to give a strong indication that the value of existing life
would decrease if we learn how to copy it, but perhaps it can be a
problem if it leads to the new, artificial life being assigned a lower
value than the original. On the other hand, we do not know how
crucial this lack of originality will be.
The question of whether the new life can be said to add
internal originality to life and thus increase life’s value is not
entirely easy to answer.
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
Another reason why we value some works of art more than others
is because of their history and the work and skill it took to create
them (e.g., Elliot, 1982). This is something that is not only true for
art. We generally tend to value things higher if they are difficult
to achieve and we tend to value things higher if fewer people can
accomplish them. Is the same true for life? So far, no human has
succeeded in creating life, and that is not because we have not
tried. If one of the reasons why we value life so highly is that it is
very difficult to make from scratch, then how will the value of life
be affected when we learn to create it?
The life that exists on earth today, “life 1.0,” differs, of course,
from works of art in that it has not been created in the same way
as works of art, and above all in that there is no artist behind
the creation (Elliot, 1982) (I assume here that there is no divine
creator behind the emergence of life. If one believes that life as we
know it has a creator, then there is at least no human artist behind
the creation of life).
Can the origin of life then be compared with the creation of a
work of art even if there is no creator of life as we know it today? It
is difficult to talk about things like skill and creativity when there
is no creator, but our task is not to identify any skilled or creative
artist behind life 1.0 that we can honor. Our task is to find out
what gives life its value and whether it is diminished if humans
seize the ability to create new life. If we return to the Mona Lisa,
it can be said that we have reason to admire both the work and
the artist. When it comes to life 1.0, we have no artist, but can the
way in which it has originated still give us reason to admire “the
work,” that is, life?
We do not yet know exactly how life came into being, so how
can we say that the circumstances of its origin give us reason to
attach special value to it? One answer to that question may be that
the very fact that we have not yet figured out how it happened
indicates that it was not a simple process. For us to achieve
the ability to create life is thus something that must require an
enormous amount of work and probably a real dose of genius.
Nobody has done that so far. This means that the analogy with
works of art can still hold. Even though the work of art differs
from life 1.0 in that the former has an artist while the latter has
none, life still has in common with the most valuable works of
art that they are things that not everyone can create. If at least
part of the value of life is based on it being so difficult to create
that no human has managed to do it, then it looks like we have to
accept that the value of life will diminish if we learn how to create
life from scratch.
As in the previous section, it is important to distinguish
between how a human ability to create life will affect the value of
the created life and how it will affect the value of existing life and
life in general. We noted in the previous section that no matter
how many copies there are of a work of art, the original is still
the original. In the same way, no matter how many people copy
something, it is always a greater achievement to be the first to
do something. Kleinig (1991) argues that it is not originality per
se but the “manifestation of creativity” that gives original works
of art a value that copies lack. If someone succeeds in copying
a work of art, it is still just a matter of copying. Making a good
copy can be very difficult and require a skill that few can fully
acquire, but it cannot be compared to the skill and creativity
required to be the first to come up with something. The same
goes for inventions and scientific discoveries. The inventor or
discoverer is honored much more than those who make copies
of the invention or repeat the experiment or observations behind
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the discovery, and rightly so. Doing something for the first time,
from the beginning, without someone to copy or learn from is
an extraordinary achievement. This indicates that the creation of
artificial life will not affect the value of the current life, but that it
could affect the value of the synthetic life negatively.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that given how
difficult it is to copy life, copying it must also be regarded as an
incredible achievement that requires a lot of knowledge and great
skill. If a thing that can never be copied is worthy of great respect,
a thing that takes more than 4 billion years to copy deserves
almost as much respect. This in turn indicates that even if the
value of the synthetic life is lower than the value of the original,
it is still very high. The researcher or research group behind the
first instance of synthetic life will have made a fantastic scientific
achievement. It will, of course, be an achievement based on an
intensive study of life that already exists. In comparison with
existing life, it will therefore remain a copy, but in comparison
with other human achievements, the first creation of artificial
life will still be one of the more impressive achievements in the
history of our species. If the history behind the origin is important
for something’s value, this also means that even if synthetic life
will not have the same value as existing life, it will have a higher
value than almost all other human creations.
Maybe the knowledge of how to create life will eventually
become publicly available and maybe after a few years it will
not require much skill or any creativity to create life anymore,
but even when that is the case, life will still be one of the
natural phenomena that it has taken humans the longest time
to copy, which should make it only marginally less valuable
compared to something that has never been copied, and much
more valuable than anything else that has been copied, including
all the artworks of the world.
THE MYSTERY OF LIFE
It has sometimes been argued that one of the things that makes
life special is that we do not really understand it. Even though
knowing how to make life is not the same as understanding
life, or even how it actually originated on Earth, it is probably
safe to say that when we talk about such a biologically and
technically complex challenge as creating life, it implies a rather
deep knowledge about life. This means that if we manage to learn
how to create life from scratch, that would for sure take away
some of the mystique. In that case, the very knowledge required
to create artificial life would cause a loss of value, even if it is not
actually used to create life. The knowledge as such would take
away some of the mystery and thus some of the value of life.
Similar to what we have seen before, there would be a
difference between life 1.0 and life 2.0. That is, between the life
that exists on earth today and the synthetic life. The difference,
in this case, is that even if we succeed in figuring out how to
create life, it does not necessarily mean that we have answered
the question of how life actually arose on earth. Strictly speaking,
it would only mean that we have found one way in which life can
arise. We still cannot know for sure if the life that now exists on
Earth originated in the same way. It is conceivable that there is
more than one way in which life can arise. It is most likely also
the case that what is required to create life in a laboratory on Earth
today differs at least in some ways from what was required for life
to arise spontaneously about 4 billion years ago when the Earth
and its atmosphere looked completely different from today. The
ability to create life would undoubtedly help us dispel some of
the mystery surrounding how life 1.0 originated, but it would not
remove it completely in the same way that would be the case for
life 2.0, whose origin would be described in the smallest detail by
its creator. This means that if mystery is important for the value of
life, then we are, again, in the situation that we need to distinguish
between the value of original life and the value of synthetic life.
For the synthetic life, there would be no mystery surrounding
its origin, while the mystery surrounding the original life and its
origin would only be dispelled to some extent. The value of life
1.0 would therefore be affected, but to a lesser extent than the
value of the synthetic life that arises thanks to our knowledge of
how to create it.
Is the mystery surrounding the origin of life important for
its value? Life can, just like art, be surrounded by mystery in
many different ways (What is really behind Mona Lisa’s difficult-
to-interpret smile and what were the circumstances around its
theft?). The mystery surrounding the origin of life is only a part
of the mysteries of life. It is certainly not a small part, but is it the
only mystery that determines its value? In the case of the Mona
Lisa, that does not seem to be the case.
Perhaps it is more appropriate to look at how mystery is
connected to value in the case of magic than in the case of
a painting? Magic is a form of performing art where mystery
around the execution is the very core of its value. On the other
hand, if we witness a fantastic and seemingly incomprehensible
magic trick and we, after much thought, manage to figure out how
it was done, what does that mean for our fascination? I cannot
help but suspect that it would actually lead to us remembering
that night at the theater with even greater satisfaction than if
we never manage to figure out how the trick was carried out.
However, we would certainly be disappointed if someone told
us about it and thus deprived us of the chance to figure it out
ourselves. In that case, however, it does not seem that we are
deprived of the mystery, but of the chance to challenge our
ability to solve it.
There are also many cases where it is obvious that more
knowledge makes us value something higher. People who
work with nature conservation often point out (personal
communication, see also Elliot, 1982) that one of the best ways
to persuade people to take better care of a nature area is to
teach them about the species, ecology, geology, and not least, the
history of the area.
The role of mystique as a value creator is thus not entirely
unambiguous. Even though it is certainly true that mystery can
make us value something higher, increased knowledge, especially
knowledge that explains something we have thought about hard
and long, can also make us value it higher. Also, it seems to
differ from person to person. My personal experience is that the
more I understand a phenomenon, the more exciting it becomes.
This is, of course, a personal reflection and it is quite plausible
that for others, “de-mystification” is actually a problem. The
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fact that this varies from person to person will, on the other
hand, also make it less of a problem. If someone feels that the
understanding required to create life will diminish the value of
life for them, then they will probably not be willing to invest the
time and effort that will undoubtedly be required to achieve this
type of knowledge about life. Perhaps they will even actively avoid
exposing themselves to such knowledge. This means that as long
as it is voluntary to learn about life to the degree required to
recreate it (which would reasonably far exceed what, for example,
may be required to graduate high school even with top grades),
and as long as it is all about the personal feeling of mystery, it will
be easy to opt-out of this knowledge for those who so desire and
continue to marvel at the mysteries of life.
It is a different issue if one’s valuing of life is diminished by
the mere knowledge that someone knows enough about life to
recreate it. This is undoubtedly a possible position, but it seems
quite extreme, and it would be even more extreme to demand
that others stop researching a topic for that reason. To stop
investigating something because there are those for whom it is
perceived as negative that someone (even if it is not themselves)
know how it works, would be going way too far. This is especially
true considering that many others (not just me) will actually be
influenced in the opposite direction and see life as even more
exciting and amazing thanks to this type of knowledge.
THE NATURALNESS OF LIFE
Another possible reason why the creation of synthetic life might
reduce the value of life could be that the resulting life will be
unnatural in some sense (Siipi, 2008; Bedau and Triant, 2009).
It is a common idea that what is natural has higher value than
what is unnatural (Elliot, 1982; Angermeier, 2000; Rolston, 2001;
Siipi, 2008; Ode et al., 2009; Lustig, 2013; Román et al., 2017. See
Kleinig, 1991; Bedau and Triant, 2009; Lustig, 2013 for a critique
of naturalness as conveyor of value). Life in its original form
may be considered the archetype of naturalness. Life that has
been modified and thus in some sense has become less natural,
however, is already today viewed with skepticism by some. If
the naturalness of life is something that contributes to its value,
then perhaps the advent of truly synthetic life will diminish
the value of life.
The term “unnatural,” like its opposite, “natural,” is
notoriously difficult to define. It is particularly difficult to
define in a way that is reasonably informative and normative at
the same time. That is, it is difficult to define in such a way that
it specifies what is unnatural and why, while at the same time
explaining why being unnatural would mean being less valuable.
There are hundreds of definitions of “natural” and
“unnatural,” and it is impossible to go through them all
here. One criterion of unnaturalness that is included in many
definitions and that would be relevant in our case is that
something is man-made (Hunter, 1996; Rolston, 2001; Siipi,
2008; Vining et al., 2008). It does not have to mean that man as
such is unnatural. It seems that many people’s intuitions about
the boundary between natural and unnatural go precisely at
what humans do, not at being human as such. In many cases, it
also seems to be a matter of degree rather than “either-or.” That
is, things can be more or less natural (Angermeier, 2000; Siipi,
2008). This way of reasoning implies, for instance, that a dog that
has come about through breeding would be less natural than a
wolf but more natural than a dog that has come about through
genetic modification. Breeding means that we intervene in nature
by selecting the dogs for breeding that best match our ideals. We
thus take over the role of “natural selection,” which accelerates
evolution and guides it in a certain direction, desirable to us.
Genetic modification means that we take another step by also (at
least in part) taking over the role of creating the genetic changes
on which the selection is based. To create life from scratch,
according to this reasoning, would be to take another long step
from the natural, and probably reach as far as one can come in
terms of unnaturalness when it comes to life.
However, it is far from obvious that it makes sense to make
this kind of distinction. It is not clear why a higher degree of
human influence on a process makes it less natural if we at the
same time accept that humans are part of nature. It is also unclear
how to connect naturalness and value. If naturalness is only a way
of indicating how little humans have been involved, how do we go
from there to saying that more natural is better than less natural?
In many cases, human influence has certainly led to problems
in nature, but at the same time, it is difficult to deny that many
human inventions in, for example, medicine and technology have
actually been very useful and made our lives better. We also must
not forget the human inventions to which we attach value in itself,
such as art and literature. It thus seems that there are at least
some obvious exceptions to the assumption that human impact
is necessarily negative. This indicates that human involvement
as such is maybe not a good basis for value or disvalue. It can
therefore be difficult to maintain a general principle that the more
human impact, the lower the value. Using “naturalness” as a fancy
term for “human involvement” does not seem to change this. It
can even be perceived as a way of trying to obscure a dubious
connection by using fuzzy terminology.
If we still accept that the degree of human influence
determines how natural something is, and that being less natural
also makes something less valuable – two assumptions that
as we saw, are far from obvious – then the question remains
what this means for the value of life if and when we learn to
create synthetic life.
Again, we must distinguish between the synthetic life (life
2.0) and the original (life 1.0). If we accept that more human
intervention means less naturalness and thus lower value, then
it becomes obvious that synthetic life becomes less natural and
thus less valuable than the life we know today that arose long,
long before humans entered the scene. Thus, we again need to
distinguish between the value of the new, synthetic life on one
hand, and how the emergence of synthetic life will affect the value
of existing life. The perceived connection between naturalness
and value will affect the synthetic life much more than the
original life, which in turn leads to a worrying difference in value
between them. One might even suspect that synthetic life will
serve as a contrast to the original life and make it seem even
more natural, which could make the difference even greater, at
least in our minds.
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However, we should also look at things from a longer
perspective. What happens after a few generations when the new
life is not that new anymore and the organisms created by us have
started to multiply on their own? Will all life that descend from
synthetic organisms be unnatural forever, or will the organisms
that descend from the first synthetic organisms gradually begin to
be considered more natural because these later generations have
arisen and evolved through the laws that govern all life, original
as well as synthetic? [Douglas et al. (2013) answers this question
in the negative].
In summary, it can be said that if we base value on degree
of naturalness, it points in the same direction as most of the
properties we have discussed above, that is, even if we seize the
ability to create life, it will not significantly affect the value of
existing life, but it might create a gap between the new and the
old life, which can be a source of concern. However, we must also
remember that naturalness seems to be a highly dubious trait on
which to base the value of life.
THE AUTONOMY OF LIFE
Is it possible that if we learn to create life, we take over a power
that properly belongs to life itself, and that in doing that, we
take away some of nature’s value? It is sometimes said that we
“play God” when we manipulate life and even more so if we
learn how to create it from scratch (see Bedau and Triant, 2009;
Boniolo, 2009; Douglas et al., 2013; Kaebnick and Murray, 2013;
Link, 2013; Melin, 2021 for discussions). The purpose of the
“playing God-objection” is usually to convey either that even if
we have enough practical knowledge to do something it does not
imply that we also possess enough wisdom to use it in a safe
way, or that we have just overstepped a boundary that should
not be overstepped. It is certainly true that through synthetic
biology, and in particular by acquiring the ability to create life
from scratch, we will acquire “a degree of control over the basic
mechanisms of life that human beings have never attained before”
(Kaebnick and Murray, 2013), and it does indeed require us to
ask with Kaebnick and Murray (2013): “is that quest desirable? Is
it troubling?”
The use of the phrase “play God” in the sense that we lack
the wisdom to fully understand the consequences of what we do
is mirrored in many literary works ranging from Frankenstein
(Shelley, 1818) to Jurassic Park (Crichton, 1990). In these cases,
however, it seems that the problems are of a different kind
than the one we discuss about the value of life. In the case of
Frankenstein’s monster, it seems that the real problem is that
Frankenstein do not take proper care of the life he created (Cabak
Redei, 2021), and in the case of Jurassic Park, it seems that
John Hammond and his bioengineers overestimate their ability
to control the life they create. Both of these literary works provide
good reasons to think twice before we set out to create (or, as in
Jurassic Park, recreate) life, but they do not seem to have anything
to do with the value of life as such.
The other sense of the phrase “play God,” that is, that we have
overstepped some boundary that we are not supposed to overstep,
can be interpreted either theologically or secularly. When used in
a secular sense, it is common to mean that we take over a power
that in some sense belongs to nature and that this overtaking
can negatively affect the value of nature. Elliot (1982) exclaims in
his critique of nature restoration projects: “We value the forest
and river in part because they are representative of the world
outside our dominion because their existence is independent of
us” (Elliot, 1982).
Can this line of thought, motivate the feeling that if we acquire
the ability to create life, we acquire a power that rightly belongs to
life itself and that acquiring this power diminishes the power and
thus the value of life?
A general difficulty with the argument that we take over the
power to create life from life itself is that it is a bit unclear how
it should be interpreted. Life has the ability to create more life,
but it has never had the ability to create life from scratch. Life
did not exist when life first arose. In fact, one could even turn the
argument around and say that once humans acquire the ability to
create life from scratch, this actually means that life (in the form
of human beings) for the first time on our planet acquires the
ability create new life (not just more life). We could thus say that
through us, life acquires the power to create life. Humans learning
to create new life will thus increase the power of life over itself
rather than reduce it.
However, we can also look at this from an equality perspective.
By learning to create life, we “give” life an ability that no life has
had before, but it is an ability that will only be possessed by one
life form – humans (and not even all humans). It thus widens
the already existing immense power gap in nature between our
species and all other species. How much difference this added
power makes in practice is difficult to speculate about. The fact
is that we already, to a large extent have the power to control
the living conditions for virtually all life on earth. There are of
course worrying practical implications of this power but that is
another matter. In the worst case, perhaps the new life might
become invasive and thus will pose a threat to existing life. At
best, perhaps the knowledge we gain through our attempts to
create synthetic life make us better at taking care of existing life,
though not much indicate that this is how we are going to use
that knowledge. Guiding research and development in the right
direction is an extremely important challenge, but it does not
seem to be about the value of life as such, but rather about how
we best take care of life given that it actually has a high value.
However, there is another aspect of this that may give cause for
concern. Some believe that the new life will be seen as machines
or goods and that this will spread to all life, including the original
life (see Bedau and Triant, 2009; Douglas et al., 2013). This
is an attitude to life that can really cause concern. The idea
is that by acquiring the ability to produce life at will, we will
come to consider all living organisms as products among other
products. This is a way of taking control of life that would be
clearly negative.
One can object here that living beings are to a large extent
already regarded as products and raw materials in this way.
How non-human animals are regarded and treated in society
as a whole, as resources, entertainment and more, is one of the
greatest and most offensive moral failures of our species. The
real question here, however, is whether this will worsen with the
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advent of artificial life. We cannot deny that there is a risk to
that. On the other hand, we have also seen that society’s norms
generally move slowly toward being more inclusive. More and
more groups have come to be included in the moral community
and this also applies (though painfully slowly) to non-human
animals. We do not know if this trend will continue, and we
cannot know for sure how it will be affected if we succeed in
creating synthetic life. It seems, however, that the most important
question is how we treat the life we create, not how it has come
about (Douglas et al., 2013; Cabak Redei, 2021).
CONCLUSION
If humans acquire the ability to create synthetic life, it will
have some very important consequences. It will provide large
benefits but also risks. One risk that is sometimes pointed
out is the risk that it will diminish the value of life. In
this article, we have analyzed five properties that are strongly
associated with life, strongly associated with value, and risk
being negatively affected when humans learn to create life. The
properties that were discussed are originality, origin, mystery,
naturalness, and autonomy.
It turned out that even if we accept both that these properties
are important grounds for valuing life, and that they will be
negatively affected by our ability to create life, then the value of
the original life (life 1.0) does not seem to be in danger. On the
other hand, it may be that the value of the synthetic life (life 2.0)
will be negatively affected, which in turn can lead to a disturbing
difference in value between different kinds of life.
On the other hand, we also came to the conclusion that it
seems doubtful whether a future human ability to create life
will really have a great negative impact on these characteristics.
We must also remember that here we have only discussed
characteristics that have been selected precisely because they
might be negatively affected by a future human ability to create
life. There are also many other reasons to value life, reasons that
will not be affected at all by a human ability to create life, which
means that even if an ability to create life will negatively affect the
value of life (or at least affect the value of life 2.0), it will only affect
a part of life’s value (including the value of life 2.0).
That said, of course, there are also a number of other concerns
regarding synthetic life that need to be looked into before we start
creating. How it will affect how we value life is but one of them
and it is still true for synthetic life, as it is for all other fields of
research: It is not enough to ask, can we do it. We must also ask,
should we do it.
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